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CHAPTER NINE
ISLAM AND PUBLIC PIETY IN MALI*
BENJAMIN F. SOARES
Since the late nineteenth Century and the onset of colonial rule in
West Africa, scholars, including colonial scholar administrators, hâve
devoted considérable attention to the study of what has been assumed
to be thé main institutional form for thé practice of Islam in West
Africa: the Sufi orders, the mystical paths. In an almost unending
stream of studies, various scholars—politica! scientists, sociologists,
geographers, historians, and those in religious studies—have focused
on Sufi orders in various countries of the région. It is important to
note, however, that Sufi orders have never had the importance in
large parts of West Africa—in Mali, Niger, Côte d'Ivoire—that they
may have had, say, in Senegal or elsewhere in the Muslim world
(cf. Soares 1997, 1999). When scholars in West Africa have not
focused on Sufi orders, they have tended to study the critics of the
Sufi orders—so-called "reformists," Salafis, or, more recently, Islamists
(for example, Rosander and Westerlund 1997). Most West African
Muslims I have encountered during the course of my research—and,
* Various parts of the research for this study, including field and archivai research
in Mali, Senegal, and France in 1991, 1992, 1993-1994, and 1998-1999, were
funded by the U.S. Department of Education (Fulbright-Hays), the Fulbright Program
of USIA through the West African Research Association/Center, the Wenner-Gren
Foundation, and Northwestern University. The NIMH Program on Culture and
Mental Health Behavior at the University of Chicago Committee on Human
Development and the National Science Foundation-NATO provided funds in the
form of postdoctoral fellowships for the writing. Portions have been presented to
the European and American Young Scholars' Summer Institute, "Public Sphères
and Muslim Identifies" in Berlin; the Department of Anthropology, the London
School of Economies; the conference, "L'Internationalisation du religieux" at the
Institut d'Études de l'Islam et des Sociétés du Monde Musulman, EHESS, Paris;
thé West Africa Seminar, UCL, London; the Islamwissenschaftliches Kolloquium,
Universität Bayreuth; and the Third" Mediierranean Social and Political Meeting,
Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, European University Institute,
Florence. I am grateful to those audiences. As always, I am most indebted to the
many people in West Africa who hâve helped me with this material and its analysis.
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I claim, many of those I have learned about through reading colonial
archives—are neither formally affiliated with any of the Sufi orders
present in West Africa nor are they "reformists" or Islamists. Moreover,
many West African Muslims categorically reject such appellations.
This is not to deny the importance of Sufi orders, Sufism, or
"refbrmism" in Mali. Rather, since all of these objects of study are
so thin on the ground, it would seem to follow that we should shift
our attention away from préoccupations with such presumed forms
of Muslim social activism, not least since the events of September
11, 2001.
In this chapter, I do not privilege such catégories in my analysis.
During the course of fieldwork in Mali in the 1990s, it would have
been difficult to avoid, let alone ignore, the many discussions Malian
Muslims were having about Islam. Some of these discussions focused
on questions of doctrine and "correct" ritual practice—for example,
whether Friday communal prayers had to be performed in a mosque.
Others focused on Muslim politics—for example, whether Muslims
should be opposed on principle to the Gulf War and subséquent
U.S. and British air strikes against Iraq in the 1990s. However, many
of the discussions about Islam in Mali centered on more genera!
questions of piety and the "correct" ways of being a pious Muslim.
Indeed, there seemed to be considérable concern with—and often
debate about—the public signs of piety.
On numerous occasions during my fieldwork, Malian friends and
informants asked me whether I had noticed the mark or sign on a
particular person's forehead. They used the term seere in Bamana/Bam-
bara, Mali's most important lingua franca (or seede in Fulfulde/Pulaar),
which some of my informants told me dérives from the Arabic,
shahâda, meaning testimony or witness, as in the Muslim profession
of faith. This term, seere, refers to the sometimes circular spot or
mark on some people's foreheads. Many Malians note that such a
mark indicates regulär prayer—even beyond the obligatory five rit-
ual daily prayers—and presumably appears from touching the fore-
head to the ground. For many, such marks index piety. By all
accounts, these marks are much more prevalent that they used to
be. I myself have noticed the appearance of the marks on the fore-
heads of several friends and acquaintances between different periods
of fieldwork in Mali, sometimes to my astonishment. What follows
is an attempt to make sense of such signs. However, I must first
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present quite a bit of background information in order to under-
stand the link between piety and some of its public signs in Mali.
Islam in Malian History
Although Islam has been practiced in Mali for at least a millennium,
it was only in the twentieth Century that Islam became the religion
of the majority. It has largely been through the development of a
public sphère that this Islamization has occurred. Arguably, a public
sphère has been developing in Mali that differs considerably from
the idealized bourgeois public sphère described by Habermas (1989
[1962]; cf. Calhoun 1992), in which there is a space for so-called
rational critica! debate, and religion clearly has no place. Elsewhere,
I have traced some of the éléments of such a public sphère in Mali
back to the colonial period, when the spread of newspapers, publi-
cations, political parties, associations, and organizations opened new
spaces for political and social debate and délibération (Soares 1996,
1997). Following John Bowen, who has written about Aceh in
Indonesia, I would argue that in Mali there is a "public sphère of
discourse that combines religious, social, and political messages"
(Bowen 1993: 325). By considering the development and contours
of this public sphère, I explore hère some of the enduring paradoxes
that have accompanied the spread of more standardized ways of
being Muslim in Mali.
First, let us examine briefly the features of Islam in the région (cf.
Launay and Soares 1999). Although it is difficult to speak with great
précision about the nature and extent of Islamization before the
twentieth Century, we do know that in the precolonial and early
colonial periods (at least until the first decades of the twentieth cen-
tury), religious practices often reflected membership in hereditary
social catégories. That is, whether people practiced Islam and the
way in which they did so often had to do with their hereditary social
status. Certain lineages were known as Muslim religious specialists
or marabouts in French colonial parlance. They historically had con-
trol over Islande religious knowledge, éducation, and sometimes trade.
The hereditary transmission of both learning and sanctity has been
historically very important here. Members of lineages of religious
specialists and their descendants were generally those who performed
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the ritual daily prayers, fasted during the month of Ramadan, and
abstained from consumption of alcohol. In short, they exhibited some
of the outward signs of the practice of Islam. Other lineages, some-
times even members of the political/military elite who were Muslims,
did not—nor were they expected to—conform to the standards of
piety that were typical of clerics.
If before colonial rule Muslim elites had almost a monopoly on
Islam, transformations of the entire political economy during colo-
nial rule would change this. The increased movement of persons and
commodities rendered some of these elites obsolete and helped to
facilitate the Islamization of large segments of the population. Indeed,
the period of French colonial rule in West Africa—from the late
nineteenth Century until 1960-—witnessed the rapid spread of Islam
in new areas and among groups that had historically not been Muslim.
Many non-Muslims, including urban and agricultural laborers, con-
scripts to the army, students in colonial schools, and increasingly
their village kin were converting to Islam. At the same time, more
standardized ritual norms were spreading among virtually all Muslims,
including those Muslims who had previously not been expected to
conform to such norms. Thus, people from all sectors of society
(members of the precolonial political/military elite, recent converts
to Islam, and those of marginal social status—hereditary "caste" and
servile status) began to emulate the religieus practices of Muslim cler-
ics. Religieus practices, such as regulär prayer and fasting during the
month of Ramadan, became ritual norms for all Muslims regardless
of social distinctions, hereditary or otherwise. This helped to make
the practice of Islam—especially in its public ritual forms—more uni-
form across space and time. It is striking that today one of the most
commonly used terms for Muslim in Bambara, selibaa (most likely
from the Arabic, salât), means quite literally "one who prays." To
ask "do you pray?" or "does hè pray?" is the ordinary way to inquire
whether someone is a Muslim.
Although it is important to look to the colonial era to understand
such changes, there are also generally overlooked antécédents for the
public sphère in nonsecular discursive forms in this part of West
Africa. Prior to colonial rule, debates between Muslim religieus fig-
ures—a small educated elite for whom classical Arabic was the main
language of written communication—often centered on such ques-
tions as the legitimacy of rule by particular Muslims and non-Muslims,
includins- the French, the licitness of trade with non-Muslims, and
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so forth.' We have évidence of such debates in the form of various
treatises in Arabic and oral histories and narratives from the pre-
colonial and early colonial periods.2 During the colonial period, the
French administration sought the "loyalty" of virtually all MusJim
clerics to whom ordinary Africans were assumed to owe allegiance.3
Although during colonial rule some Muslims migrated for politico-
religious (not to mention economie) reasons to areas beyond French
control and argued that others should do the same, most did not.
Most Muslim elites accepted the fact that they were living under
non-Muslim rule and did not deern flight or migration (hyrd) from
such rule necessary.4 Acceptance of French rule occasionally came
enthusiastically and, at other times, grudgingly. As the decades of
French rule passed, for those least enthusiastic about the French
présence there was résignation if not acceptance. Debate and délib-
ération between Muslims about political and economie issues such
as the legitimacy of non-Muslim rule was, on the whole, attenuated
during the colonial period. This was more or less the case until the
1950s, the decade leading up to independence.
Muslim Preachers and Public Sermons
There was an important development in the propagation of infor-
mation about Islam during the colonial period that is useful for help-
ing us to understand the émergence of more uniform ways of being
Muslim. Drawing upon preexisting discursive forms and particularly
written forms, Muslim preachers during the colonial period began
to address sermons on specifically Islamic thèmes to the public out-
side the context of the mosque. Such preachers came to constitute
1 For examples of such debates in the precolonial period, see Mahibou and Triaud
1983 and Hunwick 1996. For discussion of one such debate under French colonial
rule, see Soares and Hunwick 1996.
- Many from the région can be found at the Centre de Documentation et de
Recherches Ahmad Baba in Timbuktu and in private collections. See Hunwick 2003
for an extensive list of some of the extant documents and published works from
the région.
3 On French colonial policy toward Islam and Muslims in West Africa, see
Harrison 1988; Launay and Soares 1999; Robinson and Triaud 1997; Brenner
2000; and Soares 1997, 2000b.
4 Certain Muslims did migrate, for example, to the Middle East. See Ould Cheikh
2000 for a discussion of a West African living in Palestine who condemned West
African Muslims for accepting life under French "infidel" rule.
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in effect a new category of religieus personality. In large parts of
French West Africa, public sermons came to be known in various
vernacular languages as waqju (or warnte in Wolof ) from the Arabic
wa'z, meaning sermon (cf. Launay 1992). Such sermons became an
increasingly populär form of communicating to large groups of peo-
ple, both Muslim and non-Muslim. Although it is not possible to
date the arrivai of this discursive form in West Africa or to trace its
relationship to developments elsewhere in the Muslim world, it cer-
tainly existed prior to colonial rule. The expanded public sphère
under colonial rule facilitated the spread of public sermons, how-
ever, and they became one of thé principal means for facilitating
the spread of Islam and for thé standardization of Islamic practices,
with implications for public piety in Mali.
It is important to note that there were various kinds of Muslim
preachers who used thé public sermon. In fact, preachers from thé
colonial-authorized Muslim establishment sometimes gave public ser-
mons on subjects of interest to the colonial administration. French
colonial attempts to use Muslim clerics to exert influence over Muslims
in this part of Africa are perhaps best exernplified in the career of
one religieus personality, Seydou Nourou Tall. From thé 1930s
onward, Seydou Nourou Tall was the Muslim religious leader in
West Africa closest to thé French, perhaps even the embodiment of
thé colonial-authorized Muslim establishment.5 A grandson of al-Hajj
cUmar Tall, thé leader of a nineteenth-century state who had clashed
militarily with thé French, Seydou Nourou traveled thousands of
kilometers across French West Africa on behalf of a succession of
colonial administrations, encouraging colonial subjects not only to
obey thé French and its représentatives but also to pay taxes, to
work in colonial projects, to ignore calls to strike, to use colonial
health facilities, not to immigrate to neighboring colonies, and to
perform their Islamic "religious duties."6 Many of Seydou Nourou
5 Seydou Nourou Tall's colomal-era activities are discussed in documents through-
out colonial archives in Mali, Senegal, and France. See, for example, thé collec-
tion of documents compiled upon his behalf in thé Archives Nationales du Sénégal
(Dakar), 19G 43(108), Oeuvres de Seydou Nourou Tall en AOF, 1923-1948. For
discussions of his career, see Garcia 1994, 1997; Soares 1997; and Seesemann and
Soares n.d.
6 See, for example, Archives Nationales du Mali, Koulouba (hereafter ANM), 4E
2382 (I) Traduction des conseils donnés par El Hadj Seydou Nourou Tall à tous
\fi mmnlmam Tune 95 1941
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Tall's public pronouncements—usually in thé vernacular language of
his audience—took thé form of a public sermon in which he related
the topic at hand to the discursive tradition of Islam, and especially
thé Qur'ân and thé hadîth. In one of his sermons in thé 1940s, he
spoke about such "civic" duties as obédience to French authority
and thé need to fulfill one's religious obligations as Muslims, which
he stressed were much casier given thé conditions of colonial rule
(see also Chailley 1962). In any case, this new form of public ser-
mon— waqju—that sometimes linked Islam with thé objectives of the
state spread throughout French West Africa. Such public sermons
also helped to spread a more standardized Islamic culture premised
on thé notion that all Muslims should hâve similar duties and rit-
ual obligations. Eventually, such preachers would widen their appeals
to encourage those who could afford to do so to perform the hajj
and to contribute funds toward the construction of new Friday
mosques in colonial centers, such as Bamako, the Malian capital.7
But these public sermons were not to remain the preserve of the
colonial-authorized Muslim establishment, nor were members of this
establishment the only ones to use such sermons to promulgate the
idea that regulär prayer and fasting during the month of Ramadan
were to be ritual norms for all Muslims.
Paradoxically, the new colonial public sphère created a space in
which various kinds of Muslim preachers flourished and made pub-
lic pronouncements about the practice of Islam that were nonpolit-
ical (at least from the perspective of the French). That is, they did
not contest French authority. In colonial archives, one can read about
individual Muslims—I want to call them freelance Muslim preach-
ers—who gave sermons and sometimes traveled around to do so.
Many of these preachers actively sought to convert non-Muslims to
Islam; they also admonished people to give up their un-Islamic prac-
tices. In many reported cases, they tried to get people to relinquish
or to destroy their allegedly un-Islamic ritual objects—"fetishes" in
the colonial lexicon. It was usually when such preachers disrupted
the colonial "public order" that they came to the attention of the
French and were sometimes arrested and even sent into exile—hence
traces in the colonial archives. Indeed, colonial reports document
numerous cases in which conversion to Islam and the destruction of
7 See Centre des Archives d'Outre-Mer, Aix-en-Provence, France (hereafter
CAOM1 l Aff Pol 99V5/4 L'Islam au Soudan, Rapports Trimestriels 1954.
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ritual objects in various places led to open conflict, often along gen-
erational lines.8 That is, younger people, frequently migrants, con-
tested the authority of non-Muslims, who were quite often their
elders. Issues of gender were also important here, since most of the
first converts seem to have been men. There are also reported cases
of certain preachers haranguing those who considered themselves
Muslims for failing to practice Islam correctly. For example, some
preachers openly criticized African colonial civil servants for drink-
ing alcoholic beverages and/or for exceeding thé maximum of four
wives permitted according to thé rules of Islamic jurisprudence.9
Many of these freelance preachers, some not discussed in détail
in thé colonial archive or discussed only in passing, carried out the
work of spreading Islam. Sources here include triumphalist oral nar-
ratives and hagiographie accounts in Arabie (and sometimes in French).
One of the freelance preachers frequently discussed today, who also
left considérable traces in thé colonial archives is Cheikh Salah Siby
(ça. 1888-1982), a Dogon convert to Islam, largely credited with
spreading Islam among thé Dogon.10 Although those familiär with
thé Griaule school of French ethnology might find the idea of a
Dogon Muslim an oxymoron, Cheikh Salah is just one of many such
Dogon converts to Islam. During the colonial period, Cheikh Salah
actively began to instruct people in what he took to be proper Islamic
religious practice—ritual daily prayer, fasting during the month of
Ramadan, getting people to slaughter animais according to thé rules
of Islamic jurisprudence (halâl), and so forth-—some of the outward
signs of Islam. From thé 1940s on, he mainly directed his attention
to two groups of socially marginal people: first, his fellow Dogon,
many of whom took him to be a living Muslim saint, and second,
8 Documents m ANM and CAOM hst many cases from thé twentieth Century
that are too numerous to mention here. For example, see CAOM 75 APOM 4/4,
Haut-Sénégal-Niger, Internement de Fodé Ismaila et consorts, Rapport, September
25, 1911. Early published colonial accounts include some of Paul Marty's writings
(for example, Marty 1920), whereas later colonial accounts include one of Gnaule's
rare discussions of the spread of Islam m West Afnca (1949) and Cardaire 1954.
See also Manley 1997.
9 See, for example, ANM, 1B 150, Letter, Fama Mademba, Sansanding, to thé
Administrator, Ségou, April 23, 1909. I am grateful to Richard Roberts for bring-
ing this document to my attention.
10 See, for example, CAOM l Äff. Pol. 2259/4, Soudan français, Direction Locale
des Affaires Politiques (hereafter Äff. Pol.), Bulletin No. 2 (Confidential), November
1953, "Note sur l'Islam au Macina."
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some of thé many former slaves in thé région. Thèse were sizeable
groups whom their Muslim neighbors often treated with disdain. In
any case, such people—mostly récent converts to Islam—were begin-
ning to emulate thé conventions of religious practice, as well as stan-
dards of piety, of those with claims to Islamic religious authority—thé
Muslim élites. Most of the newly Islamized also abandoned other
public signs—such as long braided hair for men and certain forms
of facial scarification for their children—that indexed them as non- ^
Muslims. In any case, this particular preacher was helping to facil-
itate thé émergence of a more generally shared way of being Muslim.
Such developments were only possible given the complex transfor-
mations occurring under French rule and with thé expansion of the
public sphère.
It would be hasty, however, to assume that thé adoption of out-
ward—indeed public—signs of Islam meant that allegedly un-Islamic
traditions were no longer important. Over time, various kinds of
such "traditions" were desacralized and made into local and regional
folklore. In some cases, the thérapies or medicines of non-Muslim
healers were also desacralized and, therefore, rendered licit for Muslims
who might seek to use thèse along with or as an alternative to thé
increasingly available Western biojnedicine. Other "traditions," such
as certain masking traditions, were not so much desacralized as made
into children's games held at fertain points in thé Islamic calendar,
and, therefore, rendered "harmlëss." Still yet other allegedly un-
Islamic "traditions"—forms of spirit possession and thé use of cer-
tain non-Islamic ritual objects—have been increasingly relegated to
private or at least semipublic„>enuis, that is, out of the view of
potential critics, Muslim or othërwisë." It is here that one can see
some of those excluded fronr thé expiinding public sphère in which
Islam dominâtes.
Muslim Associations and New Muslim Intellectuals
In contrast to the freelance Muslim preachers, new Muslim associ-
ations were founded in urban areas, increasingly from thé 1930s
onward. These new Muslim associations ostensibly admitted ail
11 Since such "traditions" are oftëfT noijpublic or are only semipublic, thé ana-
lytical optic of "counterpüblics"~is'lrgttäbly applicable here.
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Muslims as members, but tended to attract those who were colonial
civil servants, former soldiers, and others involved in thé new colo-
nial urban centers of economie activity (cf. Loimeier 1999; Meillassoux
1968; and Gomez-Perez 1991, 1997). Some of these early associa-
tions sought to encourage and facilitate the hajj, which increasingly
became a goal of an expanding and aspirant African Muslim bour-
geoisie.12 Several of the associations organized public meetings where
invited speakers, including prominent African Muslim intellectuals,
talked about such topics as Muslim unity and morality.13 Working
with one association, Fraternité Musulmane, Mahmoud Ba, a West
African educated in Mecca in the 1930s, gave public addresses in
which he condemned Muslim youths for being more drawn to drink
and pleasure than to practicing religion.14 According to French
accounts, such meetings were decidedly nonpolitical or at least gen-
erally avoided political issues. In 1948, however, after developments
in Palestine, one organization made public statements that "this dis-
pute" did not concern West African Muslims living under French
rule.15 It is noteworthy that the public meetings of these associations
generally ended with speakers thanking France for her "civilizing
mission," however perfunctory such statements might seem.16
By the early 1950s, certain West African Muslim intellectuals began
to enter the public arena in new ways. In contrast to those Africans
who had engaged in French-language secular schooling, such as many
of the members of the early Muslim associations, these intellectuals
were part of a newly émergent, highly educated Muslim elite, who
had undergone advanced Islamic éducation, whether in Mali, else-
where in West Africa, or abroad, at institutions like al-Azhar in Cairo
12 On the %, see Cardaire 1954 and Chailley 1962.
13 For example, in the late 1940s, a new organization, Fraternité Musulmane
(founded in 1936), organized "des réunions publiques où les mêmes thèmes de
morale, sociale et religieuse, sont développés: condamnation du gaspillage à propos
de mariage; union des musulmans, respect du Coran; condamnation de la fré-
quentation des salles de bal." See CAOM, l Äff. Pol 2259/1, L'Islam en AOF,
Äff Pol Musulmanes, Rapport Tnm,, 2d & 3d tnm., 1948. Thèse same thèmes
are among those discussed by many Muslim associations m Mali today.
" See CAOM, l Äff Pol. 2259/1, Äff. Pol Musulmanes, Rapport Tnm, 2d
tnm , 1950; see also Kane 1997. 447ff. for a discussion of Mahmud Ba's preach-
mg from thé 1940s onward, and Brenner 2000.
15 See CAOM l Äff. Pol. 2259/1, L'Islam en AOF, Äff. Pol Musulmanes,
Rapport, 2d & 3d trim. 1948.
16 See, for example, CAOM l Äff. Pol. 2259/1, Äff. Pol, Musulmanes, Rapport
Tnm 3d trim 1950
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or thé Dar al-IJadîth in thé Hijaz. Inspired by thé nationalism sweep-
ing thé Arab world, thé independence of British colonies, most
notably, India and Pakistan in 1947 with their large Muslim popu-
lations, and thé independence of Libya from Italy in thé early 1950s,
some of thèse Muslim intellectuals sought to connect anticolonialist
ideas with more reformist ideas about Islam. Given that their activ-
ities were under constant surveillance, they were not able to act as
freely as thé colonial-authorized Muslim establishment. Indeed, some
"reformist" preachers were subject to harassment after making their
own public pronouncements that were deemed insulting to thé French
or other Muslim clerics; they sometimes had their schools closed and
were occasionally imprisoned for allegedly disrupting public order
(see Brenner 2000; Kaba 1974).
In thé early 1950s, "reformist" Muslim intellectuals17 in what is
present-day Mali (together with intellectuals from thé neighboring
French colonies of Senegal and Guinea) founded thé Union Culturelle
Musulmane (the UCM, Muslim Cultural Union), a voluntary organi-
zation whose stated objectives included "thé establishment of a
reformed Islam [un Islam rénové], éducation, and thé libération of the
African Man [l'Homme Africain]" (cited in Chailley 1962: 46).'8 Some
of thèse reform-oriented intellectuals also published pamphlets in
French and Arabie that explicitly expçessed anticolonial views. In the
introduction to one such pamphlet, Cheikh Touré boldly identified
"the trio" of the "Capitaîist, -Marabout [Muslim cleric], [and]
Colonialist," who "exploited, misled, and oppressed" people in West
Africa (Touré 1957: 1). This author even decried "thé collaboration
with thé [colonial] authoritiës camed on even in our mosques, meet-
ings, and [during] religious hoHdays'l (Touré 1957: 9-10; see also
Diane 1956 and Chailley f96§)rln*1954r after thé outbfeak of war
in Algeria, some of thèse inteUectuals demanded that West African
Muslims not be sent to serVe JENorth Africa. In some oP their pub-
lic pronouncements and purJliiiëd wrîtings, thèse reformists criticized
" During thé colonial period in West Africa, French colonial administrators used
"Wahhabi" rather loosely to refer to "reformist" Muslims, and this terminology con-
tinues to be used there today in both French and in thé region's vernaculars. On
buch "reformists" in Mali, see Kaba 1974; Hamès 1980; Amselle 1985, Triaud
1986; Niezen 1990; Brenner 1993^2,000; SofresJ997; ancLHock 1999.
18 Mali's first postcolonial sodâîislfreglme $ Modibo JK-eita disbanded thé UCM.
Following thé overthrow of jthe régime ïn $6$, theJLJCM was allewed to reorganize,
but disbanded a second tirne in;!97II Onjthe t|CM jn Soadan/Mali, see Kaba
1974 and Amselle 1985. z
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certain Muslim clerics for what they considered to be un-Islamic
practices. They condemned in particular their use of the Islamic eso-
teric sciences, those areas of secret or mystical knowledge ("magie"
by most anthropological définitions), as well as for the pedagogical
style of "traditional" Islamic éducation centered on the memoriza-
tion of texts. In général, these new Muslim intellectuals sought to
change the way Islam had long been practiced in West Africa in
order to bring it more in line with what they deemed to be more
"correct" practices, modeled on the presumed center of the Islamic
world, the Arab Middle East. Toward this end, a number of them
set up their own "modern" Islamic educational institutions in some
of the largest towns, borrowing their pedagogical style from the colo-
nial French-language secular schools (see Brenner 1991, 2000).'9
When these "reformists" entered public debate, they helped to
anirnate discussions about what it meant to be Muslim—what was
the proper way to be Muslim. And since the 1950s, some of the
ongoing debates and sometimes conflicts about Islam in Mali have
been between the heirs of some of these urban-based reformists and
those we might call "traditionalist" Muslims, who are more closely
identified with Sufi orders and traditional Islamic éducation. Over
time, there have been heated debates between these groups about
religieus doctrine and practices—for example, about whether to cross
one's arms across the ehest during prayer. What is remarkable, how-
ever, is the actual convergence between such reformists and those
they criticize about the practice of Islam and piety over the past few
decades. In fact, "reformists" and "traditionalists" generally agrée
that all Muslims should practice a more standardized Islam—regu-
lär prayer, fasting during the month of Ramadan, and the haj) when-
ever possible. They are frequently in agreement about the kinds of
"traditional" or "magicoreligious" practices—most notably, spirit pos-
session and the use of un-Islamic ritual objects—that they find objec-
tionable (Soares 1999). Moreover, they are also sometimes united in
their opposition to the secularism of the postcolonial state.
19 See Brenner's discussion of the colomal-backed "counterreform movement"
(2000) There were also other Muslim intellectuals whose perspectives might be
rallpr) nro-Frpnrh "moHprrmf" Muslim
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The public sphère that developed under colonial raie and through
which public sermons spread has only continued to expand in the
posteolonial period, in which the Malian state is ostensibly committed
to the principle of laïcité. Today the public sphère is animated
by religieus éducation, sermons, print and audio-visual media, and
the country's Islamic organizations, all of which have been influ-
enced by transnational and global interconnections (cf. Bowen 1993;
Eickelman and Piscatori 1996; and Anderson 1991). This public
sphère has helped to make information and ideas about Islam (not
to mention other areas of knowledge), including that from beyond
the immédiate area, more reailily available to the public. Although
this public sphère is perhaps 'more vibrant in urban areas, it also
extends into some of the far reaches of the country where for many
people to be Malian means to be Muslim. The public sphère has,
if anything, helped to fester a supralocal sense of shared Muslim
identity in Mali, an imagined Community of Muslims often linked
to the Malian state whose members are to varying degrees attentive
to the broader Islamic world that lies beyond the state boundaries.20
There are of course those exclüded from such a sphère, most notably,
Christians and other non-Müslims in Mali. Although some Malians
see themselves as participating directly and unambiguously in the
global Islamic community — the umrrfa — many other Malian Muslims
recognize différences between thèmselyfes and others that cannot be
elided in the imaginingjDf such a Çarîsnational community.21 This
imagined community oft,Muslirns_ in-Mali helps shape the way ordi-
nary Muslims practice Islam. This public sphère has helped to cre-
ate pressures to standardizê Islamic practices, especially in their public
ritual forms.22
With the shift to more standarcJGzejf norms of piety and the rise
of an ostensibly more uniform way oj" being Muslim, what Eickelman
has called a "generic Isllfh" (lâô9b)/"onê rrfght suspect that there
20 This formulation of a Muslim community has been mflüenced by van der
Veer's (1994) discussion of rehgious nationalismjn=Indtó
a This is not m any way fö suggest theZejdstencé8 of anythmg like the Afrïcan
Islam ("Islam noir") of the colomaMntógirMioï1"
•" The debate about "ortKbpraxy" 'm Is&rrr-is relevant here Cf Smifh 1957,
Asad 1986 and EirkHman 1989a J=~
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would no longer be any place for the hereditary transmission of
learning or hereditary sanctity or charisma. This is not, however,
the case. In many places in Mali, including western Mali, lineages
of religieus specialists have been able to retain control over Islamic
religieus éducation and leadership positions such as imam, not to
mention rôles in the various Sufi orders. This has also been the case
in some urban areas where people have objected to recent converts
to Islam and even their descendants acting as imam.23 Members of
lineages of religieus specialists continue to have réputations for their
knowledge and use of the Islamic esoteric sciences.24 Almost without
exception, Muslim saints and other esteemed living or deceased reli-
gious personalities corne from thèse same lineages thought to have
access to such secret knowledge. In some cases, certain living Muslim
saints have flourished along with the expansion of the public sphère
(Soares 1997, 1999, 2000a).
If these might seem to be examples of all that is "traditional" in
contemporary Mali, it is useful to consider one of Mali's—may I
dare say—more postmodern religious personalities to understand how
différences between Muslims continue to be so important. Chérif
Ousmane Madani Haïdara (b. 1955) is the head (or "spiritual guide")
of Ançar Dine (in Arabic Ansär al-dïn), one of the more successful of
the many new Muslim organizations that have proliferated in Mali
since the overthrow of President Moussa Traoré's authoritarian regime
in 1991 (see Hoek 1999 for an extensive, though necessarily incom-
plete, list of such new organizations). He is perhaps Mali's most con-
troversial and flamboyant Muslim media personality. Ever since being
arrested and banned from preaching on several occasions in the late
1980s for allegedly insulting remarks, Haïdara has managed to garner
considérable public attention.25 He states quite emphatically that hè
u See Chailley (1962: 29-31) for a discussion of a case from the mid-1950s when
groups of Soninke and Toucouleur founded their own mosque in Bamako radier
than accept an imam who was Bambara. I learned about similar contemporary
cases during field research.
24 Such knowledge and its use are no less important to what it means to be
Muslim for many whose lives are increasingly associated with the modern—here
higher rates of literacy and secular schooling.
25 Some of the Malian newspaper coverage of Haïdara and his foilowers include
Sidibé 1993; Traoré 1996; Coulibaly 1999, 2000; and Diarra 2003. He is invari-
ably mentioned as among the country's most influential preachers in recent news-
paper coverage of "Islamic" issues in Mali.
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fashions himself after the Egyptian preacher 'Abd al-Hamïd Kishk
(see Kepel 1986), and that Kishk's sermons have provided inspira-
tion for his own. Haïdara appeals to a mass public—including many
who are illiterate—in Mali and among Malian migrants elsewhere
in Africa and in Europe largely through his sermons (in Bamana/
Bambara) on audiocassette and>video that circulate widely.26 Haïdara
has received considérable media" attention for provocative public state-
ments hè has made about the immorality and dishonesty of politi-
cians (much like Kishk), merchants, and other clerics, as well as for
his interventions in debates about public morality and the correct
practice of Islam. His is a project focused on the shaping of moral
subjects in the public sphère, a very public Islam that also includes
a social agenda. In this way, hè „is not unlike such colonial-era Muslim
preachers as Seydou Nourou Tall. In his sermons and other public
pronouncements, Haïdara has jnsisted that Malian Muslims—many
of whom know little Arabkr^can „perform the ritual daily prayers
(salât in Arabic) in whatever "yernäcular language they speak. The
discussions and controversy aBöut this and other subjects raised in
his sermons have undoubtedly helpéd to spread his réputation, even
notoriety.
Although the media have been central to the making of Haïdara's
career, his ability to receive a forum—even to enter public debate
about morality and Islam—secms to; relate in no small part to his
status as a member of „a lineage claiming deseent from the Prophet
Muhammad. In fact, his patronym, Haïdara, indicates sharifian de-
scent here, as it does in large parts of Muslim West Africa. However
important his personal charisma, which includes his skills as a tal-
ented orator and his media sayvy, aüthoritative hereditary charisma
seems to be the conditibfi^bf plossibility for the making of his career.
Furthermore, Haïdara—-Jvh^ip^söme consider an Islamist—is often
venerated much like ä ^idliörial" Sufi saint. I have watched as
people have approached hirfFffi kiss his han<l or be touched by him,
that is, in exactly the same, way many Maüan Muslims approach
descendants of the Prophet Muhammad or other saintly Muslim
figures. Although I have witnessed Malian "reformist" and "mod-
ernist" Muslims react to such displays toward Haïdara with dismay,
26 In 1999, Haïdara told me that hè had-been making sermons on audiocassettes
for more than sixteen years.
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sometimes even utter disbelief, most Malians do not find the vénér-
ation of Haïdara in any way surprising.
Islam in Public
Ritual daily prayer and particularly communal Friday prayer have
become perhaps the most public of all signs of piety in contempo-
rary Mali. Fasting during Ramadan and the breaking of the fast at
sunset have increasingly become public acts, especially in urban Mali.
The hajj—the pilgrimage to the Holy Cities—is also a public act,
when pilgrims embark on their voyage and upon return. Such pub-
lic signs have not, however, guaranteed the probity of everyone's
piety. It is interesting to note that those of "caste" and servile sta-
tus and recent converts to Islam were among the first to finance the
construction of large and imposing mosques in their natal villages
throughout Mali. Even these acts, perhaps the most visible and there-
fore public acts of piety, have not erased individual actor's marginal
status in relation to Muslim elites—clerics and marabouts—as far as
matters Islande go. Even today, when such people have been able
to perform the hqjj their motives have been questioned. More gen-
erally, as the number of those from broad sectors of the society going
on the hajj has increased, so have suspicions that many ordinary
Malian Muslims might have less than pious motives for performing
the hajj. Many Malians joke about their compatriots performing what
they call "the business hajj" that is, traveling to the Holy Cities
under the pretext of the hajj with the real objective being com-
merce—to purchase consumer items such as electronics, jewelry, and
so forth to resell at a substantial profit in Mali.
At the beginning, I mentioned one public sign of piety that is
especially important. This is seere, the dark, sometimes circular, spot
or mark on some Muslims' foreheads. As I have noted, some state
that the mark indexes regulär prayer beyond the obligatory five rit-
ual daily prayers and presumably appears on the forehead from
touching the ground during prayer. Many Malians readily note that
the Prophet Muhammad's close companions had such a mark. Those
with formal Islande éducation can easily identify textual sources where
this mark and those close people to the Prophet Muhammad are
discussed—most importantly in one of the suras in the Qur'an (al-
faäi, 48: 29).
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It is instructive to focus on these publicly visible signs of piety not
only because they were the subject of considérable discussion in Mali
but also because they are not limited to any one group of Muslims.
That is, they are not limited in the way that, say, beards and black
veils might be limited to reformists or so-called Islamists. In a sense,
they concern all Muslims and the more standardized set of norms
that have become widespread in this setting.
When some of my Malian informants and friends spoke about the
marks on people's foreheads, they did so as a way to refer to how
much a particular person apparently prays as a Muslim. In this way
of thinking, the mark indexes piety. Or, at the very least, it indexes
performance of prayer that is regulär, even out of the ordinary in
its regularity. Many Malians think and state otherwise, however; they
note that many of the most pious Muslims they know do not have
this mark, though admittedly some do. Some refer mockingly in
French to those with the dark spot as having Ie tampon noir, the black
stamp—the ubiquitous bureaucratie seal the French colonial state
introduced—on their foreheads. Many state that certain Muslims will
go to great lengths for people to think they are pious. Indeed, some
even speculate that many Malians will rub something on the fore-
head—even a stone—until such a mark appears. Several people told
me that they too could easily have one of these marks if they wanted.
Over the course of my fieldwork, I began to notice these marks
on various people's foreheads, almost all of whom were adults. They
were from all sectors of society, from schoolteachers and civil ser-
vants to market traders, the unemployed, and Muslim clerics. They
included some of my male friends in their thirties and forties, and
relatives of my informants, including a few adult women. Although
some of those who have these marks were esteemed religieus lead-
ers, including some with saintly réputations, they were clearly not
the overwhelming majority. In fact, the overall pattern was, at least
for me, entirely unexpected.
Prominent Muslim religious leaders aside, many of the Malian
Muslims whom I know with these marks fall into two catégories
(what follows draws on conversations with some of my more socio-
logically minded informants). First, there are those of relatively mar-
ginal social status, who, despite the performance of the practices of
a standardized Islam that has become more widespread through the
public sphère or even the financing of new mosque construction, are
not readily accepted as Muslims on par with the descendants of the
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hereditary Muslim clerics. For example, former slaves, members of
"castes," and descendants of récent converts.27 A subcategory hère
would be some of thé ordinary Muslim women I know who are
childless and hâve thèse marks. The exemplary piety of such women
and thé mark that indexes this piety, I suspect, relate to their inabil-
ity to bear children in a setting where childbearing is greatly val-
ued. Second, there are various persons from all sectors of society
whose moral character is in question, usually because of charges of
corruption, embezzlement, or illicit sexual activities; or because of
thé amassing of considérable wealth under économie conditions that
are very precarious. For example, I know several civil servants—
some of whom are members of prominent lineages of Muslim reli-
gious specialists—who have been charged with stealing public funds
upon whose foreheads thé marks hâve appeared. In one case, thé
mark appeared after a period in prison. Similarly, there is the case
of one friend accused of embezzling money from his father's pros-
perous import Company who also had a mark appear. I also know
young well-to-do businessmen—French-educated in some cases—with
réputations as notorious womanizers with thèse marks.
One might read thé appearance of such marks as attempts to clear
one's name after public embarrassment or to safeguard one's répu-
tation. But it is perhaps unwise for thé anthropologist to speculate
about the intentionality of actors. Indeed, it might even be churlish
to read thèse signs as acts of délibération—that is, actions of mind-
ful bodies. Be that as it may, it is clear that there is no better way
to prove one's piety than through signs that are publicly recognized
as valid.28 Whether thé individual actor uses such signs consciously
is perhaps beside thé point. What is important to note is that actors
exhibit their piety according to certain accepted norms and they do
so publicly, that is, in ways that thé public sphère encourages. As I
hâve suggested, some of thèse signs of piety, and thé marks in par-
ticular, are not unlike what linguists hâve called hypercorrection
27 See Ahmed 1981, who discusses low-status Bengali Muslims whose stratégies
of "upward mobility" included claiming descent from high-status Muslim groups in
Bengal and emulating their practices. I am grateful to Naveeda Khan for bringing
this source to my attention.
28 Cf. Salvatore's discussion of "staging virtue" in Egypt (1998) and Hirschkind
on thé ethics of listening (2001).
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in language use, or thé quest for what Bourdieu (1984) has called
"distinction."
Unlike Habermas's view that "public opinion" is key to the public
sphère (1989 [1962]), thé "consensus" (ijmä'} of the Muslim com-
munity is what seems to be of paramount importance in Mali. After
ail, on the one hand, there does seem to be "consensus" about proper
Islamic religious conduct, thé appeal of a more "generic Islam," and
identifiable processes of thé standardization of religious practice and
public piety. On the other hand, there are real différences, which
belie thé existence of any such publicly proclaimed or tacitly accepted
"consensus." As I hâve argued, hereditary sanctity and distinction
remain very important factors in how Islam is practiced in post-
colonial Mali. Moreover, thé "consensus" about proper public con-
duct and piety excludes ail of those whose actions in private or in
semipublic venues do not partake of thé consensus. It is the much-
discussed seere that helps to illustrate some of thé paradoxes of the
"consensus" about public piety within thé broader public sphère in
Mali. Some of those Muslims with such an ostensibly visible sign of
piety on their foreheads actually risk publicly betraying their inau-
thenticity—in short, their very lack of piety—to other Muslims. This
has been a topic of much discussion, both in public and in private,
among many, if not all ordinary Malian Muslims for whom piety
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CHAPTER TEN
FRAMING THE PUBLIC SPHERE:
IRANIAN WOMEN IN THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIG*
FARIBA ADELKHAH
It is possible to understand thé 1979 Iranian Révolution and thé Is-
lamic Republic that emerged from it in terms of the formation of a
public space. The successive crises that thé régime experienced should
then be read according to the splits that such a process créâtes.
Major political scandais, such as thé trial of the former mayor of
Tehran, Gholamhossein Karbashi (1998), or more recently thé Sharam
Jazaeiri Arab affair (2002), originated with thé private appropriation
of public funds, although thé distinction between private and pub-
lic was hardly clear from thé perspective of the différent protago-
nists. The repression of Islamic intellectuals critical of the Republic,
such as Mohsen Kadivar or Hassan Yossefi Eshkevari, was justified
not for what they thought but because they expressed their views in
public rather than within the "qualified" circles of the clérical estab-
lishment. Not all truths are good to say in public. The conflict
between "conservatives" and "reformers" turns in large measure on
thé définition of public space and thé modes of legitimate action
within it. The polemics and repression engendered by student démon-
strations, thé use of satellite dishes, and women's présence in sports
stadiums exemplify mis conflict.
For over forty years the relation between the private and public
sphères has been a subject of constant debate in Iran. It was shaped
by thé issue of social being (adâm-e ejtemâi), characterized by com-
mitting oneself to others in thé public domain and redefining one's
relations with others. Secular and religieus thinkers, as well as social
movements, have been major contributors to this process. Beginning
in thé 1960s, this thème was developed in the struggle over what
has been called thé "modernization" of Iran. It has concerned thé
* Dale F. Eickelman translated this chapter from French into English, and Gène
R Garthwaite orovided assistance in transhterating Persian technical terms.
